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ABSTRACT:  We argue that the central goal of critical thinking is the making of reasoned judgments. 
Arriving at reasoned judgments in most cases is a dialectical process involving the comparative weighing 
of a variety of contending positions and arguments. Recognizing this dialectical dimension means that 
critical thinking pedagogy should focus on the kind of comparative evaluation which we make in actual 
contexts of disagreement and debate. 
 






The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue for a particular approach to critical thinking 
pedagogy. Our argument is aimed particularly at those courses taught at the post-
secondary level which currently tend to focus on analyzing and evaluating individual 
arguments in the name of critical thinking instruction. 
 We shall argue that the underlying concern of critical thinking is the making of 
reasoned judgments. Arriving at reasoned judgments in actual cases is a dialectical 
process involving the comparative weighing of a variety of contending positions and 
arguments. Thus taking seriously the dialectical dimension implies having as a central 
focus for both theory and pedagogy the kind of comparative evaluation which we make in 
actual contexts of disagreement and debate. 
 In order to make this case, we draw upon arguments concerning the nature of 
argumentation. Thus a note about how we view the relationship between critical thinking 
and argumentation is in order. Although we agree with theorists who argue that the two 
are not synonymous and that critical thinking may include aspects that do not focus on 
arguments (e.g. Govier 1989), nonetheless, we believe that argumentation constitutes a 
significant aspect of critical thinking. This is especially the case as we view 
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argumentation quite broadly and would argue that much discipline-specific reasoning, 
including inference to the best explanation or the justification of interpretations of an 
artwork, constitute examples of argumentation (Bailin & Battersby forthcoming). 
Because of the centrality of argumentation in critical thinking, we shall draw implications 
from the dialectical nature of argumentation for critical thinking pedagogy. 
 
2. ARGUMENTATION AS DIALECTICAL 
 
Our discussion will take as its point of departure three points made by Ralph Johnson: 
 
1. the theory of argumentation should develop out of an understanding of the practice of 
argumentation; 
2. an important feature of the practice of argumentation is that it is dialectical; 
3. the pedagogy of argumentation should include this dialectical dimension. 
 
 We shall begin by registering our agreement with Johnson’s first point that “the 
normative dimension of the theory of argument […] must develop out of a proper 
understanding of the practice of argumentation”1 (Johnson 2000, p. 6). It was a very 
similar view, that argumentation theory and pedagogy should be more faithful to how 
arguments are actually conducted, that motivated the Informal Logic movement, and it is 
a view with which we concur. We also concur with Johnson’s view that the aspect of the 
practice of argumentation which is missing from the theory is its dialectical dimension.  
 It is important to clarify that Johnson uses the term ‘dialectical’ to refer to a 
feature of the practice of argumentation and not to an approach to argumentation theory, 
as for example the Pragma-Dialectical approach. It is, in Finocchiaro’s terms, dialectical 
as distinguished from monological and not dialectical as distinguished from rhetorical or 
logical. We shall also use ‘dialectical’ to refer to a feature of the practice of 
argumentation.  
 What might be meant by claiming that argumentation is dialectical? In their 1987 
paper, “Argument as Dialectical,” Blair and Johnson offer the following characterization 
of the dialectical features of argumentation, a characterization which seems to have been 
followed in subsequent work. 
 
1) An argument as a product can only be understood against the background of the process of 
argumentation. 
2) The process of argumentation presupposes at least two roles: questioner and answerer, although 
the roles may be exchanged at various stages of the process. 
3) The process of argumentation is initiated by some question, doubt or challenge to a proposition. 
4) Argumentation is a purposive activity (Blair & Johnson 1987, 45-46). 
 
They summarize as follows:  
To say that argumentation is dialectical, then, is to identify it as a human practice, an exchange 
between two or more individuals in which the process of interaction shapes the product”2 (Blair & 
Johnson 1987, p. 46). 
                                            
1 “By ‘the practice of argumentation,’ I mean to refer to the social and cultural activity of constructing, 
presenting, interpreting, analyzing, criticizing and revising arguments” (Johnson 2007, 8). 
2 Johnson continues to make a similar point in more recent work: “An exchange is dialectical when, as a  
result of the intervention of the Other, one’s own logos (discourse, reasoning, or thinking) has the potential 






 In our view, these points capture some central aspects of the dialectical dimension 
of argumentation. To say that argumentation is dialectical means that it takes place in the 
context of some controversy or debate. This implies 1) that it is initiated by some 
question, doubt, challenge, and 2) that there is a diversity of views on the issue, 
arguments both for and against (if the controversy is genuine, then it is likely that there 
will be at least some plausible arguments on both sides).3 The dialectical aspect also 
means that there is an interaction between the arguers and between the arguments 
involving criticism, objections, responses, and, frequently, revisions to initial positions. 
 One implication of this view is that we seldom make and assess individual 
arguments in isolation. Rather, we make them in the context of a dialectic, of a historical 
and ongoing process of debate and critique, of competing views and the give-and-take 
among them. Thus an individual argumentative exchange must be viewed in the context 
of this dialectic (Bailin 1992, p. 64). The following reference by Blair and Johnson to 
Aristotelian dialectic captures the essence of this perspective: 
 
In Aristotelian dialectic, an interlocutor’s contribution has to be seen against the background of the 
questions already asked and the answers already given. In understanding argumentation, this 
feature points in the direction of background beliefs shared, or debated, by the community of 
informed people for whom the key propositions of the argument arouse interest and attention. 
(Blair & Johnson 1987, p. 45) 
  
3. REASONED JUDGMENT VS. RATIONAL PERSUASION 
 
An implication of the recognition that argumentation is dialectical is that, in order to 
understand the nature of argumentation and its evaluation, one needs to focus on the 
whole process of argumentation. This involves a focus on the comparative evaluation of 
competing views rather than simply on the evaluation of particular arguments. 
 Argumentation is a purposive activity, as Blair and Johnson have pointed out. We 
engage in argumentation to some end, but what that end is has been the subject of some 
debate. Johnson holds that there are different goals of argumentation: rational persuasion, 
inquiry, decision-making and justification. For him rational persuasion is primary, with 
other goals being generated from it. We agree that arguers may have different purposes or 
intentions in arguing such as the ones he lists. Nonetheless, because of the rational and 
dialectical character of argumentation, we would argue that the primary goal should be 
seen as arriving at a reasoned judgment, a process we deem inquiry.4 Whatever the 
original intentions of the arguer, because of the normative constraints on arguers to be 
open-minded, to put their arguments to the test of reason, and to be willing to concede to 
the most defensible position, the normative structure of the practice necessitates inquiry 
at some level or stage (Bailin 1992). We might think about this issue in terms of 
MacIntyre’s notion of the point of a practice, which does not necessarily or always 
coincide with the psychological purposes of particular practitioners engaging in the 
practice (MacIntyre 1984). Yet, through participating in the practice and abiding by its 
                                            
3 Johnson makes a similar point: typically “there are good arguments for and good arguments against a 
particular proposition or proposal” (Johnson 2003, 42). 
4 By inquiry, we mean critical inquiry, i.e., the process of arriving at a reasoned judgment, and not simply 
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normative constraints, one can learn to appreciate its underlying structure and share in its 
constitutive purposes. 
 In order to probe this point further, let us look at what Johnson has to say about 
his rationale for taking rational persuasion as primary:  
 
I cannot argue it here but I believe this purpose [rational persuasion] is the fundamental one and 
others (like justification, inquiry, reinforcement) can be generated from it. My strategy would be to 
mount an argument that parallels Wittgenstein’s argument that first we learn to talk to others, then 
to ourselves. We justify to others, then to self. (Johnson 2007, p. 3, note 10) 
 
We would, however, hesitate to equate justifying to others with rational persuasion. If 
you make an argument to someone, but the interlocutor presents you with sound 
criticisms and a more cogent alternative argument, then you ought to change your mind. 
If one views the purpose of argumentation as rational persuasion, and you fail to 
persuade, then the argumentation has failed. This seems an unpalatable conclusion. If the 
outcome of the exchange has been to reach a reasoned judgment, then we would want to 
say that the argumentation has succeeded. It seems to us that the ‘rational’ in ‘rational 
persuasion’ is central and points to an underlying strata of inquiry. 
 It is not our intention to imply that the purposes or intentions of the arguer are 
irrelevant to the process of argument. These purposes may frame how we go about the 
inquiry and where we put our emphasis. When I sit down to make my case in an op-ed 
piece, I am doing something which is different in certain ways than when I am discussing 
an issue with a colleague. In the latter case, I am trying to decide what to believe, and in 
the former I am trying to (rationally) persuade someone. The rational persuasion must, 
however, be preceded by inquiry in order to be rational—it involves, in effect, a 
presentation of the results of inquiry. And even when presenting my case, I have an 
obligation to be open to the objections, criticisms, and argument on the other side that 
may be offered in response. Thus I am still, in some sense, engaged in an inquiry process. 
We shall argue in due course that taking reasoned judgment as primary is also beneficial 
from a pedagogical perspective. 
 
4. REASONED JUDGMENT AND COMPARATIVE EVALUATION 
 
Thus we are arguing that we should view as the central goal of argumentation the making 
of reasoned judgments. This process of arriving at a reasoned judgment is what we refer 
to as inquiry. By a reasoned judgment we mean not simply a judgment for which one has 
reasons, but a judgment for which one has good reasons, reasons which meet relevant 
standards. Hitchcock’s revision of Johnson’s notion of argumentation in terms of 
argumentative discussion has considerable overlap with our notion of inquiry:  
 
An argumentative discussion is a sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, interpreting, 
criticizing, and revising arguments for the purpose of reaching a shared rationally supported 
position on some issue. (Hitchcock 2002, p. 291) 
 
An important difference is that Hitchcock frames his definition in terms of the purpose of 
the participants whereas we frame ours in terms of the point of the practice (a move 
which Hitchcock explicitly rejects). Nonetheless, his notion of the purpose as reaching a 





at a reasoned judgment. In addition, his list of examples of the practice of argumentative 
discussion (288) would all qualify as well as examples of the practice of inquiry. 
 Given that argumentation is dialectical, the process of arriving at a reasoned 
judgment on an issue necessarily involves the comparative evaluation of contending 
positions and arguments. Kuhn makes the point thus: 
 
Only if knowledge is seen as the product of a continuing process of examination, comparison, 
evaluation, and judgment of different, sometimes competing, explanations and perspectives does 
argument become the foundation upon which knowledge rests (Kuhn 1991, 201f., cited in Govier 
1999, p. 212).  
 
 Such an evaluation requires knowledge of the details of the current debate, or 
what Johnson refers to as the dialectical environment. He defines the dialectical 
environment as “the dialectical material (objections, criticisms, alternative positions, etc.) 
that congregates around an issue” and goes on to describe what would be involved in 
mapping the dialectical environment surrounding an issue:  
 
A mapping of the dialectical environment surrounding this issue [same sex marriage] would 
require us to lay out the various positions, the objections and criticisms of those positions, the 
responses to them. (Johnson 2007, p. 10) 
 
It also requires one to address alternative positions. Johnson views this process of 
mapping as necessary in order to be in a position to address objections to one’s argument, 
but we view it as much more fundamental. If argumentation is dialectical and coming to a 
reasoned judgment on an issue involves a comparative evaluation of contending 
positions, then having knowledge of the dialectic is central to the enterprise of arriving at 
a reasoned judgment.5 
 An example of the importance of knowledge of the dialectical context can be 
found in the role of identifying alternative arguments. A number of authors have adduced 
evidence demonstrating how significant errors of reasoning can be attributed to a lack of 
understanding of other positions (Kuhn 1991) and the failure to pursue alternative lines of 
reasoning (Finocchiaro 1994). 
 In addition to the current debate around an issue, another aspect of the dialogical 
context is the history of the debate. If an issue is controversial, it is likely that the debate 
will have gone on over a period of time. Knowledge of the history of the argumentation 
which has led to the current debate, of “the questions already asked and the answers 
already given,” can be helpful and is in some cases essential, to understanding the issue 
and the various positions which are contesting for acceptance. It is, for example, only 
possible to understand the ascendancy of certain scientific theories by understanding the 
nature of the problem which they were addressing and seeing what other theories they 
defeated and why. Only in this way we will understand why the dominant theory is seen 
as the best explanation and what issues still remain contested. Similarly, we can really 
only understand contemporary political debates by knowing something about the 
historical situation and the historical disagreements in which the contemporary debate has 
its roots. And knowing the history of a debate is important in order to determine where 
                                            
5 For a discussion of the difference between alternative positions, objections, criticisms, and counter-
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the burden of proof lies (looking at the history of the capital punishment debate, for 
example, will reveal that the deterrence argument has largely been discredited and that, as 
a consequence, any deterrence-based arguments would now assume the burden of proof). 
 
5. THE ROLE OF ARGUMENT ASSESSMENT 
 
We have argued that coming to reasoned judgment involves a comparative evaluation of 
competing cases. But what is the role of the analysis and evaluation of individual 
arguments in this enterprise? Certainly the evaluation of individual arguments has an 
important role to play as arguments are the building blocks of cases or positions. Thus an 
initial assessment of individual arguments is a necessary part of the process of arriving at 
a reasoned judgment. It is, however, not sufficient. A complete assessment usually 
requires a comparative assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the cases in which 
the arguments are embedded. 
We would, however, also question the extent to which one can actually evaluate 
individual arguments apart from the context in which the arguments are situated.6 One 
may be able to make an initial, prima facie assessment of whether a particular argument 
is fallacious, but often, in order to know how good an argument really is, one has to 
evaluate it in its dialectical context. Judging how strongly a particular set of premises 
supports a conclusion frequently requires more information than that supplied in the 
particular argument. One might, for example, construct what seems like a strong 
argument for euthanasia on the basis of individual human rights, but this argument may 
not be strong enough to prevail against arguments regarding the possible abuses of 
legalization. 
 Moreover, this type of comparative contextual evaluation will call on criteria from 
the particular area as well as traditional argument evaluation criteria.7 Thus, for example, 
evaluating a causal claim in social science may require criteria for evaluating statistical 
arguments; and evaluating a claim about the merit of a particular painting will call on 
criteria of artistic value. 
 
6. LIMITATIONS OF THE DIALECTICAL TIER 
 
As a way to recognize the dialectical dimension of argumentation, Johnson makes the 
move of adding a dialectical tier to the requirements for an adequate argument. In so 
doing, he maintains the focus on individual arguments but adds a requirement which 
enlarges the scope of what constitutes an argument. This move to have the dialectical 
dimension of argumentation reflected in the theory of argument is an extremely 
promising and important development. We would argue, however, that this approach 
does not go far enough in recognizing the implications of the dialectic dimension of 
argumentation. Taking rational persuasion as primary dictates a focus on particular 
arguments and how to improve them in order to achieve this goal. Dealing with 
criticisms, objections, and alternative arguments is a way to strengthen (or possibly 
                                            
6 We discuss the role of other types of contexts (social, political, historical, disciplinary, and personal 
perspectival) in argument evaluation in Battersby & Bailin 2009. 
7 In their 1987 paper,  Blair and Johnson state that “single arguments are normally parts of a larger process 





amend) one’s original argument(s). We would argue, however, that truly recognizing the 
dialectical dimension means more than simply discharging one’s dialectical obligation to 
address criticisms and objections to particular arguments. Rather, taking seriously the 
dialectical dimension means focusing not on particular arguments, but instead on the 
debate and an evaluation of competing cases in order to make a reasoned judgment on an 
issue. 
 Johnson has the insight that argumentation is dialectical and that current theory 
and pedagogy does not take this into account. His solution is to augment the notion of 
what constitutes an argument and build more into the requirements for argument 
adequacy. Thus a knowledge of the dialectical environment is necessary in order to 
anticipate and deal with criticisms, objections etc. and to improve one’s argument. He 
describes ways to go about anticipating objections as follows: 
 
Perhaps even more effective is the step of immersing oneself in the issue and the various positions 
that have been developed. That means becoming familiar with the dialectical environment of the 
argument [...] The better one knows the dialectical environment [...], the more successful one can 
be in anticipating various objections. Because one then knows what sorts of objections are around, 
what sorts of objections others have raised. One will be familiar with the alternative positions and 
possibly be able to immerse oneself in them in order to see how someone who holds that view 
might object. One can then make use of one’s knowledge of similar argumentative situations to 
extrapolate to the current one [...] Typically some of this thinking occurs in the construction of the 
argument—so it is likely the dialectical environment will influence the arguer in the very 
formation of the argument. (Johnson 2007, p. 4) 
 
 This process of becoming familiar with the dialectical environment around an 
issue (becoming knowledgeable about the various positions, objections, and alternative 
positions) sounds very similar to how we would describe a major component of the 
process of inquiry. For Johnson, this process in undertaken as a way to anticipate 
objections and thereby support one’s argument. However, if one then evaluates these 
various positions, arguments, objections etc. in a rational and fair-minded way, with the 
intent of identifying the most reasonable position, then one is really engaging in the 
inquiry process.  
 One criticism which has been leveled against Johnson’s inclusion of the 
requirement of a dialectical tier is that this move would lead to an infinite regress in that 
supplementary arguments may themselves require further support, and so on (Govier 
1999, p. 218). We would argue, however, that such a result is only problematic if one 
tries to build a dialectical tier into the requirements for an individual argument. Otherwise 
it can be seen as a realistic reflection of the dialectical character of argumentation, as 
Govier points out: 
 
From a practical point of view, the fact that supplementary arguments may be questioned and may 
themselves require further support is only realistic, and quite plausible when we reflect on the 
history of actual controversies about important matters. Far from showing that there is a 
problematic infinite regress in the account, it could be alleged that this indefiniteness simply points 
to a feature of real debate, one that is mirrored in the intellectual and dialectical structure of the 
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7. IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY 
 
The third point of Johnson’s which we highlighted at the beginning, and with which we 
whole-heartedly agree, is that the pedagogy of argumentation should reflect how 
arguments are actually conducted and thus should include the dialectical dimension: 
 
If my view is correct, then it follows that a critical thinker must possess as part of his or her 
argumentative skills what I called dialectical skills: being familiar with the standard objections to 
his position and responding to them, facing off against alternatives. (Johnson 2008, forthcoming, 
p. 1)8 
 
He believes, moreover, that these dialectical skills are absent from most texts and tests of 
critical thinking, which tend to presuppose a traditional account of argument. We concur 
with this diagnosis. In order to fill this lacuna, we would argue for an approach to critical 
thinking pedagogy focusing on inquiry. 
 
Teaching Critical Thinking as Inquiry 
 
What might such an approach look like and include? 1) It would have as its goal the 
making of reasoned judgments; and 2) it would emphasize the comparative evaluation of 
contending positions and arguments in actual contexts of disagreement and debate. The 
following are the aspects which we have included in the inquiry approach which we have 
developed:9  
 
1) the nature and structure of arguments, the prima facie identification of fallacies, and  
the use and evaluation of central argument types such as analogical and causal reasoning; 
2) identifying and clarifying issues, as well as determining the kinds of claims or 
judgments that are involved in different kinds of inquiry; 
3) understanding the dialectical environment, including the current debate and history of 
the debate; 
4) understanding the various aspects of context which may be relevant, including the 
social, political, historical, disciplinary, and personal perspectival contexts (Battersby & 
Bailin 2009); 
5) making a reasoned judgment, including the comparative weighing of arguments, the 
evaluation of alternative positions, synthesizing the strengths of various views, and 
proportioning judgment to the weight of evidence; 
6) making one’s own case, including constructing arguments, creating analogies, 
generating alternative explanations, and anticipating objections. 
 
 In addition to addressing inquiry in general, we also look at inquiry in specific 
areas, including the physical sciences, the social sciences, the arts, the humanities and 
                                            
8 The dialectical skills which Johnson outlines include the following: dealing with objections and 
alternative positions (including seeking out criticism); knowing what would count against one’s position as 
well as for it—knowing weaknesses in one’s own position; changing one’s mind when appropriate; taking 
time to reflect rather than rushing to judgments (Johnson forthcoming, p. 7). 





interdisciplinary contexts. Considerable emphasis is placed throughout on the cultivation 
of the appropriate habits of mind in inquiry and dialogue.  
 We see a number of benefits in this type of approach. First, in focusing on 
argumentation as it is actually conducted, the approach should furnish students with some 
of the knowledge and skills necessary for making reasoned judgments in real contexts.  
 There are also dispositional benefits to an inquiry based approach. Inquiry is an 
active process. Students go beyond evaluating the arguments that may come their way or 
be put in their path to actively seek information and arguments in order to resolve an 
issue or puzzlement. Habits of mind such intellectual curiosity, truth-seeking, self 
awareness, and intellectual perseverance may be fostered in the process. 
 An inquiry approach is also preferable to an approach based on rational 
persuasion because of the orientation to argumentation which it promotes. One of the 
challenges in teaching critical thinking is to counter students’ tendencies to  
 
avoid challenge to their own beliefs, to ignore contrary evidence, to straw-person the beliefs of 
others, to refuse to concede points, to start with conclusions and then look for arguments to 
support them, to want to win at all costs. (Bailin 1992) 
 
Thinking about argumentation in terms of rational persuasion may have the result of 
reinforcing students’ tendencies to try to find support for and persuade others of positions 
they already hold (even though this is avowedly not the intention), and it may not provide 
sufficient conceptual antidote to closed-mindedness and a desire to win. Adding a 
dialectical tier is a move in the right direction in that it imposes a requirement to look 
beyond one’s own arguments, as Govier points out: 
 
Thinking of argument as having a second dialectical tier links the practice of arguing with an open 
and flexible form of thinking in which we come to consider how other people think as well as how 
we ourselves think, and we attempt explicitly to consider and address alternatives to our own 
beliefs about the world. (Govier 1999, p. 207) 
 
 Nonetheless, the focus on rational persuasion limits the extent to which such open 
and flexible thinking is likely to be encouraged. Lawyers do, after all, anticipate 
objections to their own arguments, but they do so in the service of the effectiveness of the 
case they are making for their client. It is unlikely that in so doing, they are seriously 
considering changing their commitment to their client’s position. We would argue that an 
open-minded, fair-minded, and flexible attitude is much more likely to be encouraged by 
an approach which puts less emphasis on the persuasive function of argumentation 
(rational though it may be); which focuses on the evaluation of competing cases rather 
than on the evaluation of individual arguments; and which has as its explicit goal arriving 
at a reasoned judgment.  
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